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Abstract
The contrast between the evolution over the last decades of the EU and the US unem-
ployment rates, especially for the low-skilled, is well known. A consensus view is that these
different outcomes can be explained by the interactions between common shocks and spe-
cific institutional setups. In this paper, we emphasise the interactions between technological
changes and wages rigidities. We construct a fully calibrated general equilibrium model with
two types of jobs and two types of workers, and with search unemployment. Our simulations
show that with wage rigidities, technological changes suffice to generate a continuous rise in
the low-skilled unemployment rate and an almost unchanged high-skilled unemployment rate.
Without wage rigidities, the unemployment rates remain unchanged but the wage dispersion
widens.
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1 Introduction
The contrast between the US and EU countries in terms of unemployment is well known. In the US,
there is no trend (if any, it is negative) over the period 1960-2000, although the unemployment rate
remained abnormally large during the eighties and early nineties. In Europe, we start in the early
sixties with low unemployment rates (around 2-3% in France or Germany, that is approximately
half the US unemployment rate at the same period), but it starts increasing in the seventies
and currently remains high in a majority of countries (more than 8% in France and Germany
for instance). The rules governing the labour market (the so-called ”labour market institutions”)
are of course quite different in the US compared to most EU countries: limited social security
provisions (especially unemployment insurance), decentralised wage negotiation, ... However, most
economists agree today that such institutional differences alone cannot explain these differences.
Many European countries were already enjoying well-developed welfare systems in the late sixties,
well before the unemployment rise. It is also difficult to explain US-EU differences by country-
specific shocks. Most economic shocks (oil shocks, disinflation, introduction of new technologies,
...) were common to all countries.
Against this background, the consensus view is that the observed variety of outcomes can only be
explained by the interaction between specific institutional setups and common shocks. Despite the
difficulty of measuring ”institutions” and ”shocks”, empirical work has accumulated convincing
evidence supporting this point of view (see for instance Nickell (1997), Blanchard and Wolfers
(2000) or Bertola, Blau, and Kahn (2001)). The institutional parameters emphasised by these
studies as most important for aggregate employment are the generosity of the unemployment
insurance system and the centralisation of the wage setting process whereas employment protection
measures have no clear effect on aggregate employment. Within a general equilibrium job market
matching framework, Den Haan, Haefke, and Ramey (2001) provide evidence of the negative
effects of TFP growth, real interest rate and tax rate on employment, when institutions are not
”employment friendly” (high replacement ratio). Ljungqvist and Sargent (2002, 2004) emphasise
the role of higher firing costs and more generous unemployment benefits to explain the weak
performance of European labour market in face of higher economic turbulence. They assume
that the adoption of more and more sophisticated and complex technologies accelerated the loss of
human capital when unemployed (loss of on-the-job training). In an economy with low employment
protection and low unemployment benefits, job turnover is high (unemployment duration spell is
short) and the human capital loss is not crucial. At the opposite end, in an economy with high
employment protection and generous benefits, there is long average unemployment duration and
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the loss of human capital can become problematic. Our paper relates directly to this general
equilibrium literature but provides an alternative explanation, by emphasising the interactions
between the skill biased technological shocks and the wage formation mechanisms.
If the last decades have been characterized in many EU countries by a substantial increase in the
average unemployment rate, this average figure hides dramatic differences across skill groups. The
increase has remained fairly small for high-skilled workers, while it is usually considerable for the
least skilled groups. There is ample evidence suggesting that technological progress and other re-
lated factors (organizational change, capital-skill complementarities, etc...) may have substantially
increased the relative demand for skilled workers (see for instance Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998),
Berman, Bound, and Machin (1998), and Machin and Van Reenen (1998)). If not followed by an
increase in the supply of skilled workers and/or compensated by relative wage adjustments, such a
net demand change leads to a deterioration of the employment conditions for the low-skilled1. To
study these questions, we construct a dynamic general equilibrium model similar to that of Merz
(1995) and Andolfatto (1996), with endogenous capital and interest rates, and search frictions on
the labour market. In this way, we are able to capture the interactions between exogenous shocks
and capital accumulation, and to introduce search unemployment. We then extend this model
to distinguish two types of workers (low- and high-skilled workers). The final goods production
function is specified as a Cobb-Douglas function, as in standard dynamic macroeconomic models,
but simply extended to distinguish the two types of workers. In this setup, biased technological
change can be introduced as an exogenous change in the coefficients of the Cobb-Douglas func-
tion, implying an exogenous change in the relative demand for high- and low-skilled labour. This
formulation is in line with econometric estimates of the technological bias as reported for instance
in Manacorda and Petrongolo (1999).
The model is then calibrated on the Belgian economy and used to try to reproduce the continuous
rise in low-skilled unemployment over the last decades2. Sneessens and Shadman (2000) provide
empirical estimations of the skill biased technological changes in Belgium over the period 1976-1996,
as well as changes in the relative labour supply (proportion of the skilled population). We introduce
these two shocks into our model under two alternative assumptions. Under the first assumption,
high wages are Nash-bargained and low wages are indexed3. Under the second assumption, both
1See Appendix 1 for the evolutions of unemployment rates (by skills) and relative wages over the last 30 years
in several countries.
2Unemployment rate changes observed in Belgium over the last twenty five years have been close to those observed
on average at the European level. The analysis of the Belgian case may thus provide insights for other countries as
well.
3This indexation can be explained by powerful unions, collective agreements, ... This assumption is close to what
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types of wages are Nash-bargained. Our simulations show that under the first assumption, these
shocks suffice to generate a continuous rise in the low-skilled unemployment rate and an almost
unchanged high-skilled unemployment rate, as observed between 1976 and 1996. They also generate
a rise in job competition (more low-skilled jobs are held by high-skilled) that seems realistic given
the estimations of Hartog (2000). Under the second assumption, we can no longer reproduce these
facts and instead have unchanged unemployment rates and higher wage dispersion. In this paper,
we therefore emphasise the interactions between skill-biased technological shocks and relative wage
rigidities to explain the high European unemployment rate.
Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) examine the consequences of a skilled-bias technological change
in a model with matching frictions and a continuum of skill levels. If the economic value of non-
employment is the same for all skill groups, the wage-productivity ratio will be higher for the
less productive workers, implying a higher equilibrium unemployment rate on the corresponding
segment of the labor market. A skill-biased technological change exacerbates these differences,
by increasing the unemployment rate of less skilled workers and decreasing that of high-skilled
workers. The authors focus on the case where the labor market is perfectly segmented, so that
there is no job competition across skill groups, and all wages are determined by Nash bargaining.
This type of model can be extended to include job competition effects with two skill groups and two
types of jobs as in Albrecht and Vroman (2002) or Gautier (2002). Job competition is introduced
by allowing high-skilled job seekers to search simultaneously on the complex and the simple job
markets. When hired on a simple job, they continue searching for a (better-paid) complex job.
These models provide important insights on the externalities associated to matching processes and
on their implications for technological change and job competition mechanisms but, because of
their simplicity, they are not able to reproduce the evolution of relative unemployment rates over
the last decades.
Unlike these papers, we allow for endogenous search intensities for high-skilled job seekers (deter-
mined by expected utility maximization) and for relative wage rigidities. Moreover, unlike many
other search models, skilled and unskilled labour are no more perfect substitutes and we instead
assume a more realistic elasticity of substitution (elasticity equal to one rather than infinity). It
also implies that the marginal productivity of each job is decreasing. Finally, we embed our model
in a fully calibrated general equilibrium model and produce a quantitative estimation of the effects
of a skill biased technological shock. The simulation results are compared to real data.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to the description of firm and
we observe in most European countries, see Appendix 1.
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household behaviour and market mechanisms (matching processes, wage bargaining). We next
(section 3) calibrate the model and examine its properties through comparative static simulation
exercises. Section 4 concludes with a few remarks.
2 The Model
There are two broad categories of agents: households and firms. We assume a single representative
household. All members of the household supply inelastically one unit of labour. These consumer-
workers may however have different skill levels (low- or high-skilled workers); they may be employed
or unemployed4.
We distinguish three types of firms: two types of intermediate good firms, producing respectively
high- and low-tech intermediate goods with labour as sole input5, and one representative final firm,
combining capital and the two intermediate goods to produce an homogeneous final good. The final
good can be either consumed or accumulated by the representative household. The production of
high-tech intermediate goods involves complex tasks that can only be carried out by skilled labour.
The production of low-tech intermediate goods is made up of simpler tasks that can be carried out
by both low- or high-skilled workers. We allow for this flexibility (rather than perfectly segmented
labour markets) because this ”de-qualification” possibility has been highlighted by several studies
as an important feature of European labour markets6.
There are three types of markets: labour, goods and capital. On the labour side, we distinguish the
complex and the simple job markets. For each type of job, we assume an exogenous job destruction
rate and represent the matching process by a standard matching function. Because they know that
their application will always be turned down, low-skilled job seekers never apply for complex jobs.
High-skilled unemployed workers may look for both types of jobs, but allocate their search time
on each market so as to maximize expected utility7. High-skilled workers hired on a simple job
4This representative household formulation amounts to assuming that workers are perfectly insured against
unemployment risk. This simplification is common in the literature (see for instance Merz (1995) or Andolfatto
(1996)) and reflects the current state of the art. Taking into account worker heterogeneity due to imperfect insurance
markets would make the model totally intractable. By simplicity, we also assume one representative household with
both high- and low-skilled rather than two different representative households (one of high-skilled and one of low-
skilled). This simplification does not affect the results as long as welfare is not studied.
5The main motivation to the introduction of single job intermediate firms is to keep a tractable representation
of the wage bargaining process.
6See for instance Dolado, Felgueroso, and Jimeno (2000), Gautier (2002) or Albrecht and Vroman (2002) for a
similar representation.
7Both the low- and the high-skilled can apply for a simple job. Although the intermediate firm may have a
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may continue searching for a complex job8. On-the-job search intensity is again determined by
expected utility maximisation. All goods markets (the two intermediate goods and the final goods
markets) are assumed to be perfectly competitive. The price of the final good is normalized to one.
On the capital market, the supply is determined by the stock of capital previously accumulated
by the household. The interest rate adjusts to make the quantity demanded by the representative
final firm equal to this predetermined capital stock.
Labour market flows are detailed in the next subsection. We then successively discuss firm and
household behaviour, and the wage determination process.
2.1 Labor Market Flows
Let N ct and N
s
t represent the total number of complex and simple jobs respectively. Simple jobs
can be occupied by high- (Nsht ) or low-skilled (N
sl
t ) workers, so that N
s
t = N
sh
t +N
sl
t . Normalizing
the total labour force to one and denoting α the (exogenous) proportion of high-skilled workers
yields the following accounting identities:
N ct +N
sh
t + U
h
t = α, and N
sl
t + U
l
t = 1− α, (1)
where Uht and U
l
t denote the number of high- and low-skilled unemployed job-seekers respectively.
Let the number of complex and simple job matches be denoted by M ct and M
s
t respectively. We
assume that the number of such matches is a function of the number of corresponding job vacancies
(V ct and V
s
t ) and effective job seekers (number of job seekers corrected by search efficiencies), that
is, we use the following two matching functions:
M ct =M
c
(
V ct , sct U
h
t + sot N
sh
t
)
and Mst =M
s
(
V st , sst U
h
t + U
l
t
)
. (2)
where sct, sst and sot represent search efficiencies; the search efficiency of the low-skilled worker
on the simple job market is normalized to one. Both matching functions are assumed to be linear
homogeneous.
The probabilities of finding a complex or a simple job per unit of search intensity can be respectively
written as follows:
pct =
M ct
sct Uht + sot N
sh
t
and pst =
Mst
sst Uht + U
l
t
. (3)
preference between the two types of workers (the firm surplus depends on the worker), it never turns down an
application as long as the asset value of the job is positive.
8This seems a realistic assumption. For instance Forgeot and Gautie´ (1997) show, on French data, that over-
qualification leads to a lower employment duration and a higher mobility on the labour market.
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Figure 1: Labour market flows and transition probabilities
The probabilities of filling a complex and a simple job vacancy are similarly given by:
qct =
M ct
V ct
and qst =
Mst
V st
. (4)
The probability that a simple job is filled is the sum of the probabilities of hiring a high-skilled
worker and a low-skilled worker:
qsht =
sst U
h
t
sst Uht + U
l
t
qst and q
sl
t =
U lt
sst Uht + U
l
t
qst . (5)
Finally, we assume two exogenous job destruction rates ψ (for the complex jobs) and χ (for the
simple jobs), implying for each type of job and worker the following employment dynamics (in
terms of vacancies and job-seekers’ search effort respectively):
N ct+1 = (1− ψ) N ct + qct V ct , (6)
= (1− ψ) N ct + pct
[
sct U
h
t + sotN
sh
t
]
. (7)
Nsht+1 = (1− χ− sot pct) Nsht + qsht V st , (8)
= (1− χ− sot pct) Nsht + pst sstUht . (9)
Nslt+1 = (1− χ) Nslt + qslt V st , (10)
= (1− χ) Nslt + pst U lt . (11)
Figure 1 summarizes these labour market flows and transition probabilities. Armed with these
definitions and notations, we can now describe firm and household behaviour.
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2.2 The Intermediate Good Firms
We distinguish “high-tech” or “low-tech” intermediate good firms. All are assumed to be single
job firms. High-tech (resp. low-tech) firms offer complex (resp. simple) jobs.
The asset values of a complex vacancy and of a filled complex job will be denoted WV C and WFC
respectively. Given the transition probabilities defined in the previous subsection, these values are
determined by:
WV Ct = −a+ β˜tEt
[
qct W
FC
t+1 + (1− qct )WV Ct+1
]
, (12)
WFCt = c
c
t y
c − wct + β˜tEt
[
(1− ψ)WFCt+1 + ψ WV Ct+1
]
, (13)
where a denotes the cost of keeping the complex vacancy open, β˜t is the rate at which firms discount
future profits, while cct stands for the market price of a complex (high-tech) good and w
c
t is the
wage paid to the high-skilled worker. The productivity of the latter is equal to yc.
Asset values for simple vacancies and jobs take more complicated forms because these positions
may be held by low- or by high-skilled workers. Because of high-skilled workers’ search behaviour,
high- and low-skilled workers have different hiring and exit probabilities. They also have different
productivity levels. The productivity of a high-skilled worker on a simple job is ys; the productivity
of a low-skilled worker is assumed to be a fraction ν of the latter. Let WV S denote the asset value
of a simple vacancy, while WFSH and WFSL denote the asset values of a filled simple job held
respectively by a high-skilled and a low-skilled worker. These asset values are determined by the
following dynamic equations:
WV St = −b+ β˜tEt
[
qsht W
FSH
t+1 + q
sl
t W
FSL
t+1 + (1− qsht − qslt )WV St+1
]
, (14)
WFSHt = c
s
t y
s − wsht + β˜tEt
[
(1− χ− pct sot)WFSHt+1 + (χ+ pct sot)WV St+1
]
, (15)
WFSLt = ν c
s
t y
s − wslt + β˜tEt
[
(1− χ)WFSLt+1 + χ WV St+1
]
, (16)
where b denotes the cost of keeping the simple vacancy open, while cst stands for the market price
of a simple (low-tech) goods. The wages paid by low-tech firms to high- or low-skilled workers are
denoted wsht and w
sl
t respectively. It is worth pointing out that whether the value of a simple job
is higher or lower if filled with a skilled worker is a priori ambiguous. It depends on the expected
duration of the match, the relative wages and the relative productivity. The expected duration of
the match is lower with a high-skilled worker (he may leave for a complex job), whereas the relative
productivity ν of a low-skilled worker is a matter of calibration and can be lower or higher than
1 (in other words, a low-skilled could be less or more productive than a high-skilled on a simple
9
job).
Finally, the number of high- or low-tech firms is determined by the usual free entry conditions
(WV Ct =W
V S
t = 0)
9.
2.3 The Representative Final Good Firm
We assume a representative final good firm. Producing the final good yt requires three types
of inputs: capital Kt, high-tech (complex) intermediate good Q
c
t , low-tech (simple) intermediate
goods Qst . The demand for these three inputs is determined by profit maximization:
max
Kt+1, Qct , Q
s
t
F
(
Kt, Q
c
t , Q
s
t
)− cct Qct − cst Qst − (rt + δ)Kt, (17)
where F (.) is a linear homogeneous production function, rt is the net interest rate paid to capital
owners and δ an exogenous capital depreciation rate. The first-order optimality conditions can
then be written as follows:
FKt = rt + δ ; FQct = c
c
t ; FQst = c
s
t . (18)
where FXt is the first-partial derivative of F (.) with respect to Xt. Because the intermediate good
prices cct and c
s
t are market-clearing prices, we also have:
Qct = y
cN ct ; Q
s
t = y
s
(
Nsht + νN
sl
t
)
. (19)
2.4 The Representative Household
Let the representative household’s value function be represented by the following function of the
household’s four state variables:
WHt =W
H
(
Kt+1, N
c
t , N
sh
t , N
sl
t
)
. (20)
All members of the household inelastically supply one unit of labour. The decision variables of
the household are the consumption level Ct and the search effort of job seekers. We assume that
low-skilled unemployed workers devote all their time searching on the simple job market. Their
search efficiency is normalized to one. High-skilled unemployed workers allocate their total search
time (normalized to one) between the simple and the complex job markets. Their search efficiency
on the complex (resp. simple) job market, denoted sct (resp. sst), is an increasing and concave
function of the search time devoted to that market (eut and (1 − eut) respectively). High-skilled
9Since WV St = 0 in equilibrium, a simple firm will always accept a low-skilled as long as W
FSL
t > 0, and a
simple firm will always accept a high-skilled as long as WFSHt > 0 (as it is within our calibration, see section 3.1).
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workers employed on a simple job may spend a fraction eot of their leisure time searching for a
better paid complex job. Their on-the-job search efficiency sot is an increasing concave function
of eot. There is an on-the-job search disutility but no disutility of search for unemployed agents
10.
With these definitions and notations, the household optimization programme can be written in the
form of the following Bellmann equation:
WHt = max
Ct, eut, eot
{U (Ct)−D (eot)Nsht + β Et [WHt+1]} , (21)
U(.) is an increasing and concave utility function, D(.) is an increasing and convex disutility
function, β is a subjective discount factor. The optimization is subject to constraints (1), (7), (9),
(11) and to the flow budget constraint (income = expenditure):
wctN
c
t +w
sh
t N
sh
t +w
sl
t N
sl
t +w
u
t
(
Uht + U
l
t
)
+ (rt + δ)Kt +Πt = Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt +Ct + Tt , (22)
where wut stands for the benefits received by an unemployed worker, Πt stands for the profits
(value-added net of labour and vacancy costs) redistributed by intermediate good firms and Tt
stands for the (lump sum) taxes levied to finance the unemployment benefits. The first-order
optimality conditions can then be written as follows:
UCt = β Et
[
(1 + rt+1) UCt+1
]
, (23)
Et
[
pct sceut W
H
Nc
t+1
]
= Et
[
pst ss1−eut W
H
Nsh
t+1
]
, (24)
Deot = β pct soeot Et
[
WHNc
t+1
−WHNsh
t+1
]
. (25)
Equation (23) characterizes the optimal intertemporal consumption path. Note that partial deriva-
tives are denoted by using subscript. For instance, the marginal utility of consumption is denoted by
UCt . Equivalently, in equation (24), we denote by sceut the effect on search efficiency of marginally
increasing the fraction eut of time devoted to the search of a complex job. We similarly define
ss1−eut , with 1− eut representing the fraction of time devoted to the simple job market. The left
hand side of equation (24) represents the expected utility gain associated to an increase in search
effort on the complex job market, whereas the right hand side represents the expected utility gain
associated to an increase in search effort on the simple job market. The optimum allocation of
search intensity eut is such that the two expected marginal gains are equal. The left hand side of
equation (25) represents the marginal disutility of on-the-job search whereas the right hand side
10On-the-job disutility is necessary to get endogenous on-the-job search (if not, working agents would search full
time). Disutility of search for unemployed is not necessary, unless we allow for endogenous participation rate (which
is not the case in this model: all agents participate in the labour market).
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represents the expected utility gain of marginally increasing on-the-job search.
From the envelope theorem, we obtain the following additional dynamic relationships:
WHNc
t
= UCt
(
wct − wut
)
+ β
(
1− ψ − sct pct
)
Et
[
WHNc
t+1
]
− β sst pst Et
[
WHNsh
t+1
]
, (26)
WHNsh
t
= UCt
(
wsht − wut
)−D (eot) + β (sot − sct) pct Et[WHNc
t+1
]
+β
(
1− χ− sot pct − sst pst
)
Et
[
WHNsh
t+1
]
, (27)
WHNsl
t
= UCt
(
wslt − wut
)
+ β
(
1− χ− pst
)
Et
[
WHNsl
t+1
]
. (28)
These equations represent the households marginal value functions and are equivalent to equa-
tions (13), (15) and (16) in the firm’s section.
Finally, firms are owned by household and the rate at which future profits should be discounted is
given by:
β˜t = βEt
[UCt+1
UCt
]
. (29)
2.5 Wage Determination
The relative wage of low-skilled workers has in many countries remained remarkably stable over
the last decades11. In a context of increased relative demand for skilled workers and increased low
skilled unemployment, this relative wage stability may look strange. It can be related though to
so-called ‘envy effects’, which make workers of a given skill group sensitive to the wage received by
workers of the other group12. For instance, trade union preferences may be such that they want
average productivity growth to be beneficial to all workers, including low-skilled ones, even though
relative demand changes may imply more low-skilled unemployment as a result. This scenario
is particularly relevant in countries with generous unemployment benefit schemes and significant
union power. The stability of relative wages may be obtained through minimum wage regulations
or other wage bargaining institutions, with e.g. some sectors or unions playing the role of ”leader”.
Our objective in this paper is to evaluate the extent to which relative wage rigidities may con-
tribute to explain the rise of the low-skilled unemployment rate. We thus compare the quantitative
implications of two alternative specifications, with and without relative wage rigidities. We want
11In OECD (1996), the distribution of earnings (D9/D5 (ratio of the upper earnings limit of the ninth decile
of workers to the upper limit of the fifth decile) and D5/D1) are provided for eleven EU countries. For all these
countries (except the UK), these ratios remain fairly stable from 1979 to 1995, see Appendix 1. See also OECD
(2003) for a similar conclusion.
12Similar envy effects may be at work for regional or sectoral wages. See for instance de la Croix (1994) for a
discussion of the consequences of envy effects in a setup with group specific trade unions.
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to introduce the rigidity in the simplest possible manner and to focus on its implications across
markets, including job competition and de-skilling effects. The rigid relative wage specification
thus assumes that the wage wst paid on simple jobs is a constant fraction of the wage w
c
t paid on
complex job:
wst = γ w
c
t (30)
where the complex wage wct is determined by Nash bargaining. The value of parameter γ (the rigid
relative wage) is meant to represent the outcome from centralized labour market regulations and
institutions. We further assume that high- and low-skilled workers on simple jobs (in a context
with job competition and deskilling) are paid the same wage , i.e.,
wsht = w
sl
t = w
s
t .
The complex wage wct is renegotiated in every period with the intermediate good firm. The
bargained wage is determined by the maximization of the Nash product (see for instance Pissarides
(2000)):
max
wc
t
(
WHNc
t
UCt
)ηc (
WFCt −WV Ct
)(1−ηc)
, (31)
where ηc represents the bargaining power of high-skilled worker13. Using the free entry condition,
the first order condition gives:
WHNc
t
= ηc
(
WHNc
t
+ UCtWFCt
)
. (32)
A similar approach is used for the determination of the bargained simple wages (wsht and w
sl
t ) in
the flexible relative wage model (see subsection 3.2.2 below).
Finally, the unemployment benefit wut is assumed to be the same for all workers and indexed to
the average wage:
wut = w
u N
c
t w
c
t +N
sh
t w
sh
t +N
sl
t w
sl
t
N ct +N
sh
t +N
sl
t
, (33)
where wu is the replacement ratio.
13We do not make any distinction between a bargain with an unemployed and an overeducated worker. In both
cases, the threat point is unemployment. This assumption is quite standard in on-the-job-search literature and
allows to keep a unique complex wage. The household’s surplus is in utility term while the firm surplus is in
monetary term. To have the same units, we divide the household’s surplus by the utility. See for instance Merz
(1995) for a similar equation.
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2.6 Equilibrium
The maximization programs for both the representative firm (equation (17)) and the representative
household (equation (21)) are strictly concave. Moreover, consumption is allocated independently
of employment status (utility of consumption additively separable). Therefore, the existence of
a unique equilibrium satisfying equations (17) and (21) can be easily demonstrated using the
contraction mapping theorem (see for instance Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000)).
Given initial conditions K0, N
sl
0 , N
sh
0 and N
c
0 , an equilibrium is a vector of prices {Pt}∞t=0 =
{wslt , wsht , wct , rt, cst , cct}∞t=0 and a vector of quantities {Qt}∞t=0 = {{QFt }∞t=0, {QHt }∞t=0, {QRt }∞t=0},
with {QFt }∞t=0 = {V st , V ct }∞t=0, {QHt }∞t=0 = {Ct, eut, eot}∞t=0 and {QRt }∞t=0 = {Qst , Qct ,Kt+1}∞t=0,
such that:
• given a vector of prices {Pt}∞t=0, {QFt }∞t=0 is solution to the problem of the intermediate good
firm (equations (12) and (14))
• given a vector of prices {Pt}∞t=0, {QHt }∞t=0 is solution to the household’s problem (equa-
tions (23) to (25))
• given a vector of prices {Pt}∞t=0, {QRt }∞t=0 is solution to the problem of the final good firm
(equation (18))
• given a vector of quantities {Qt}∞t=0, {Pt}∞t=0 clears the goods and the capital markets (equa-
tions (19) and (22))
• wages are set according to the wage determination mechanism (equations (32) and (30))
• lump sum taxes are such that the government budget constraint is at equilibrium every
period: Tt = w
u
t (U
h
t + U
l
t)
3 Model Calibration and Simulations
In this section we calibrate the model and use deterministic simulation exercises to try to under-
stand the rise in the European unemployment rate.
3.1 Calibration
We use the following specific functions:
Mst = m
s
0
(
V st
)λs (
sst U
h
t + U
l
t
)1−λs
matching simple jobs
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M ct = m
c
0
(
V ct
)λc (
sct U
h
t + sotN
sh
t
)1−λc
matching complex jobs
Ft = e (Kt)
θ
(
N ct
)µ (
Nsht + ν N
sl
t
)1−θ−µ
production function
Ut = lnCt utility function
Dt = τ eot disutility function
sct = φ
sc
0 + φ
sc
1
√
eut search efficiency (i)
sst = φ
ss
0 + φ
ss
1
√
1− eut search efficiency (ii)
sot = φ
so
0 + φ
so
1
√
eot search efficiency (iii)
The matching function on each job market (simple and complex) is represented by the usual
Cobb-Douglas specification with constant-returns-to-scale.
The specification of the production function is crucial for the analysis of relative demand shifters
like skill-biased technological change. Focusing on the relative demand for workers on simple and
complex jobs in a CES framework, we obtain from standard cost minimization:
N c
Ns
=
{(
µ
1− µ− θ
)σ (
As
Ac
)1−σ} {
ws
wc
}σ
, (34)
where σ stands for the elasticity of substitution between the two types of jobs. This formulation is
similar to the one used by Katz and Murphy (1992) or Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and Violante
(2000)14. We assume constant returns to scale. Parameters Ac and As measure (specific) labor-
saving technical progress; parameters µ and θ correspond to the weights of complex jobs and of
capital respectively in the production function. The first bracketed term on the right hand side
is a relative demand shifter: a change in its value changes the relative demand for labor, at given
relative wages. Estimates of the elasticity of substitution σ reported in the literature vary a lot,
depending among other things on the type of data and on the estimation methodology. Katz and
Murphy (1992) obtain a value of 1.41, but show that a value in the range 0.5-1.5 is compatible with
observed relative wage and employment changes. Manacorda and Petrongolo (1999) obtain σ = 1
on aggregate OECD data; Sneessens and Shadman (2000) obtain a similar result on Belgian data.
We shall thus assume σ = 1 and use the Cobb-Douglas production function mentioned above. The
relative demand shift is thus given by the change in the value of parameter µ. A larger value of µ
14Krusell et al. (2000) actually use a more sophisticated representation of the production technology, with two
types of capital (equipment and structures) and with complementarity between complex jobs and capital equipment.
Because we focus on general rather than partial equilibrium, there is unfortunately no room in this paper for such
a sophistication.
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increases the relative demand for workers on complex jobs.
We represent the instantaneous utility of consumption by the logarithm of consumption expen-
ditures. The disutility of devoting leisure time to on-the-job search is assumed to be linear. We
represent the relationship between search time and search efficiency by a concave function (more
precisely, search efficiency is a linear function of the square root of search time).
The numerical values given to the parameters of these functions are reported in Table 1. One
period of time corresponds to one quarter. The psychological discount factor (β) is set to 0.99,
implying a steady state real interest rate of 0.01 (real interest rate of 4% per annum). Parameter
θ is the elasticity of output with respect to capital, and coincides with the capital share of total
income. We set it at the standard value 0.33. The depreciation rate δ is set to 0.025 and implies
a steady state capital-output ratio of 9. Labour productivity yc and ys in the complex and simple
intermediate goods firms are (without loss of generality) normalized to 1. The relative productivity
of a low-skilled worker on a simple job (ν) is set at 0.8. This value is such that, although the low-
skilled worker’s productivity is large enough to generate a positive surplus, the intermediate goods
firm prefers to fill a simple job vacancy with a high-skilled worker (more formally ν = 0.8 implies
WFSH > WFSL > 0). In other words, the higher productivity for the high-skilled more than
compensates their higher quit probability. This particular choice has however little impact on the
properties of the model. We assume that recruiting costs are higher for complex jobs (a > b). Our
calibration of a and b implies that total vacancy costs represent 3.7% of total labour costs, 2.5%
of output.
Most of the remaining parameters are calibrated on Belgian data. The reference period is the
second half of the nineties (mainly 1995-97), a period during which the Belgian economy was
neither in a recession nor in a boom. The proportion α of high-skilled workers is defined as the
proportion of workers with a education level equal to a upper-secondary degree or more. We set
α and µ (the elasticity of output with respect to complex jobs) at values corresponding to the
1995-96 values obtained by Sneessens and Shadman (2000) for Belgium (α = 0.67 , µ = 0.51). The
elasticity of job matches with respect to vacancies (λ) is usually estimated to be in between 0.4 and
0.6. Using 1997 Belgian data, Van der Linden and Dor (2002) estimate it at 0.4 (without distinction
between high- and low-skilled jobs) and we therefore follow them by setting λc = λs = 0.4, for
both complex and simple jobs.
The parameter determining the worker’s share of a match surplus is usually set at the same value
as the coefficient of unemployment in the matching function (see for instance Merz (1995) and
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Symbol Value Symbol Value
Labour force composition
α 0.67
Job destruction rates
ψ 0.025 χ 0.05
Matching functions
mc0 0.40 λ
c 0.40
ms0 0.30 λ
s 0.40
Production functions
θ 0.33 µ 0.51
e 1.00 ν 0.80
yc 1.00 ys 1.00
Instantaneous disutility of on-the-job search
τ 0.41
Search efficiencies
φsc0 0.10 φ
sc
1 0.50
φss0 0.40 φ
ss
1 1.00
φso0 0.60 φ
so
1 0.50
Vacancy costs
a 0.90 b 0.26
Wage determination
ηc 0.60 γ 2/3
wu 0.34
Subjective discount and capital depreciation
β 0.99 δ 0.025
Table 1: Numerical parameter values
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Andolfatto (1996))15. We follow this practice in choosing the value of ηc (the wage rule on the
complex job market), although in our setup it will not imply that the decentralized economy yields
a social optimum. As discussed in section 2.5, we assume that wages on the simple job market
are a constant fraction of the complex wage. This corresponds to empirical observations: over
the last decades, earnings dispersion remained stable in most European countries (see Figure 6 in
Appendix 1). We fix this ratio of simple to complex wages (γ) at 2/3. This value coincides with
the relative mean gross wage of the 33% lowest-paid workers in Belgium (see ONSS (2000)). This
ratio is moreover similar in most European countries: the OECD (1996) shows that the D1/D5
ratio (rough approximation of γ) is respectively of 0.70, 0.70, 0.61 and 0.64 in Belgium, Germany,
France and The Netherlands. The value of the average replacement ratio wu is set at 0.34, the
value estimated by Van der Linden and Dor (2002) for Belgium in 1997. The same authors estimate
a lower bound for the job destruction rate (or transition rate from employment to unemployment)
equal to 0.013 (monthly data). Simple jobs being typically more precarious than complex jobs, we
impose the complex jobs destruction rate ψ to be lower than the simple jobs destruction rate χ.
Using the Van der Linden and Dor (2002) lower-bound estimate as a reference, we set the complex
and simple job destruction rates at ψ = 0.025 and χ = 0.05 respectively (quarterly data).
For simplicity, we want to normalize to 1 the three slope parameters in the search efficiency
functions (φsc1 = φ
ss
1 = φ
so
1 = 1). However, this gives a too high elasticity of search efficiency to
shocks (more precisely, the sensitivity of sct and sot to the tightness of the complex job market is
too high) which can lead to negative values for WHNc
t
and WH
Nsh
t
(see equations (26) and (27)). To
solve this problem, φsc1 and φ
so
1 are reduced to 0.5. We still have to fix the following six parameters:
the two matching efficiencies mco and m
s
o, the three independent parameters of the search efficiency
functions (φx0 , xǫ{sc, ss, so}) and the disutility parameter τ . We choose their values so as to satisfy
the following six steady state conditions: low- and high-skilled unemployment rates around 0.20
and 0.07 respectively (values obtained from Sneessens and Shadman (2000) for Belgium, updated
for 1995-96); probabilities of finding a complex job and a simple job equal to pc = 0.40 and
ps = 0.20 respectively (estimates based on Cockx and Dejemeppe (2002) for the early nineties)16;
and equal probabilities (around 0.50) to fill complex or simple vacancies (qc and qs respectively).
These latter values are based on Delmotte, Van Hootegem, and Dejonckheere (2001). They report
15Their motivation is the so-called Hosios (1990) condition: in models like Merz’s or Andolfatto’s, this sharing
rule implies that the decentralized economy gives the same outcomes as the social planner problem.
16The probability that a worker finds a job during the first three months of unemployment is estimated at 0.64 for
a worker with post-secondary education, 0.39 with upper secondary education, 0.30 with lower secondary education
and 0.28 with primary education or no education. The values kept for pc and ps take into account both our definition
of the two skill groups and the fact that first quarter exit probabilities should be regarded as upper bounds.
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that in 2000, 52% of the total vacancies were easily filled (within 3 months), 25% were filled with
difficulty (vacancies open more than 3 months) and 33% were never filled. Carefully examining
which types of jobs are most easily filled does not suggest any difference between complex jobs and
simple jobs.
A result of this calibration exercise is that eu ∼= 0.80 and eo ∼= 0.10. In other words, skilled
unemployed spend 80% of their time searching for a complex job and 20% searching for a simple
job. Moreover, the overeducated employed worker spends much less time searching than the
unemployed. It also implies that the marginal efficiency of search for the skilled unemployed is
higher for a simple job than for a complex job, that is ∂sc/∂eu < ∂ss/∂(1 − eu). Although it is
difficult to find real data to justify these values/relationships, they seem intuitive (preference for
skilled jobs, low on-the-job search and higher efficiency when searching for a simple job). Another
result is that the proportion of high-skilled workers on simple jobs is around 8% (this is a measure
of ”job competition” or ”crowding-out”). Delmotte, Van Hootegem, and Dejonckheere (2001)
use survey questionnaires with business firms to compare the skill requirements of job vacancies
and the skill characteristics of the workers who filled these vacancies. A worker is considered
to be overeducated when his education level is above that demanded by the firm when opening
the vacancy. According to these authors, 24% of all hired workers were overeducated in 2000.
This figure may however overestimate the true number of overeducated workers. For instance, the
education level indicated by a firm when opening a vacancy may only represent a lower bound
rather than a strict requirement. Moreover distinguishing only two skill categories (rather than
three or more) will mechanically and maybe drastically reduce the number of “overeducated”
workers.
3.2 Explaining the Rise in Low-skilled Unemployment
As mentioned before, our model has been calibrated to Belgian data to reproduce the situation
observed in 1996. Our objective in this section is to assess how far the rise in low-skilled unemploy-
ment observed after 1975 can be explained by changes in relative labour demand and supply. We
thus recalculate the equilibrium values of the unemployment rates and the other endogenous vari-
ables obtained by changing only two parameters, the proportion of high-skilled workers α and the
productivity coefficient of complex intermediate goods µ. We compare stationary state equilibrium
values and discuss the main features of the model17.
17Given the model complexity, it is difficult to analytically derive comparative statistics so only numerical results
are provided. It is worth noting that all these results are quite robust to reasonable changes in our calibration.
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α µ NSB Uh/α U l/(1− α) ws/wc crowding
out
Actual data
1977 0.22 0.18 1.31 4.7% 6.8% 67% n.a.
1996 0.67 0.51 1.59 6.8% 20.1% 67% n.a.
1977-96 +0.45 +0.33 +0.28 +2.1 +13.3 +0.0 > 0
Model with rigid relative wages and endogenous crowding-out
1977-96 +0.45 +0.33 +0.28 +2.7 +10.1 +0.0 +6.4
Model with flexible relative wages and endogenous crowding-out
1977-96 +0.45 +0.33 +0.28 +1.0 +2.3 -11.3 +7.7
Model with rigid relative wages and fixed crowding-out
1977-96 +0.45 +0.33 +0.28 +4.5 +5.0 +0.0 +0.0
Table 2: Skill bias, unemployment and relative wages: comparing actual and simulated data
3.2.1 Comparative statics
Table 2 reproduces the 1977 and 1996 values of α, µ, as well as the change observed over this
period. These values are taken from Sneessens and Shadman (2000). The measure of the change
in α is based on labor force statistics; the measure of the change in µ is based on the estimation
of a Cobb-Douglas production function with three inputs (two types of labour and capital). The
net skill bias (NSB in Table 2) is a measure of the net relative demand change. It is defined as the
ratio of the relative productivity coefficient (µ/(1−µ−θ)) and the relative labour force (α/(1−α))
of high- and low-skilled workers. In a simple model without vacancy costs and job competition,
the difference between the low- and the high-skilled equilibrium unemployment rates would remain
unchanged as long as NSB is unchanged; a positive change in NSB increases the difference between
the two equilibrium unemployment rates if the relative wage is rigid18. From 1977 to 1996, the
observed net skill bias increased by twenty-eight percentage points.
Table 2 (see the “Actual data” lines) also reproduces the observed values of the endogenous vari-
ables of interest: high- and low-skilled unemployment rates, relative wage (ws/wc, where ws is
the average simple wage) and crowding-out. From 1977 to 1996, low-skilled unemployment rate
18In a Cobb-Douglas model without vacancy costs and job competition, the relative employment levels are deter-
mined by α−U
h
1−α−Ul
= µ
1−µ−θ
ws
wc
.
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has dramatically increased, while the increase has remained moderate for the high-skilled. At the
same time, the ratio between low- and high-skilled wages has remained unchanged, while the pro-
portion of simple jobs held by high-skilled has probably increased. These values and observations
are respectively taken from Sneessens and Shadman (2000), ONSS (2000) and Hartog (2000).
We see that our simulated model (see the “Model with rigid relative wages and endogenous
crowding-out” line) reproduces pretty well the changes observed over the period 1977-96: the
high-skilled unemployment rate increases moderately (+2.7 percentage points in the simulation,
+2.1 in the data), while the low-skilled unemployment rate rises strongly (+10.1 in the simulation,
+13.3 in the data). In the simulation, the proportion of simple jobs held by high-skilled workers
(crowding-out) increases from 1.8% to 8.3% (+6.4). This increase in job competition replicates
what happened in European countries over the last decades (see for instance Hartog (2000)).
3.2.2 Alternative scenarios
The model is very rich and has many different features. In this section, we test the sensitivity
of our results to alternative modeling choices and we emphasize the crucial ingredients to obtain
the quantitative results. This suggests that both wage rigidities and job competition are nec-
essary for the results and therefore may have contributed substantially to the rise of low-skilled
unemployment.
Wage rigidities
In order to better evaluate the implications of relative wage rigidities, we contrast the results
obtained under the rigid relative wage assumption to those obtained under an assumption of
individual wage bargaining similar to that taking place for complex jobs. More formally, the wage
wslt (resp. w
sh
t ) paid to a low-skilled (resp. high-skilled) worker employed on a simple job is
determined by the maximization of the Nash product:
max
wsl
t
(
WH
Nsl
t
UCt
)ηsl (
WFSLt −WV St
)(1−ηsl)
, (35)
max
wsh
t
(
WH
Nsh
t
UCt
)ηsh (
WFSHt −WV St
)(1−ηsh)
, (36)
where ηsl and ηsh represent the worker’s bargaining power (respectively for the low-skilled and
the high-skilled). These parameters are set at values such that the initial steady state values are
similar in both modeling strategies. This implies ηsl = 0.40 and ηsh = 0.48.
Table 2 reproduces the simulation results obtained with flexible relative wages (see the “Model
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with flexible relative wages and endogenous crowding-out” line). The increase in the low-skilled
unemployment rate now remains moderate (+2.3 percentage points), but requires a 11.3 percentage
points decrease in the relative wage of low-skilled workers (ws/wc). These two results are at odd
with data and mean that wage rigidities are crucial to generate the results. There is also a slight
increase in the high-skilled unemployment rate and a substantial increase in crowding-out. This
increased crowding-out may seem strange given the decrease (in both absolute and relative terms)
observed in the wage paid on simple jobs. Two effects are at work: the lower wage makes the
simple job less attractive, but at the same time it increases the number of jobs and the probability
of being hired.
Crowding-out
Repeating the same simulation experiment but this time eliminating the possibility of endogenous
job competition (see the “Model with rigid relative wages and fixed crowding-out” line) shows that
the change in low-skilled unemployment induced by the net skill bias change is only equal to 5
percentage points, compared to 10 in the model with job competition, whereas the increase in the
high-skilled unemployment rate is too pronounced19. The possibility of de-qualification is therefore
crucial to explain the worsening of the low-skilled unemployment rate and the only slight increase
in the high-skilled unemployment rate.
General equilibrium modelisation and capital accumulation
In the standard Mortensen-Pissarides one-job-one firm representation, skilled and unskilled labour
are perfect substitutes and the two job markets are independent. Here, we instead assume a more
realistic elasticity of substitution (elasticity equal to one rather than infinity), which allows for
interactions between markets: a higher demand for one type of labour mechanically increases the
marginal productivity of the other type of labour and hence its demand. As a result, the effects of
shocks are magnified. In fact, we develop in this paper a general equilibrium modelisation, which
means that we have interactions between all markets. For instance, capital stock is also included in
the production function and its variation is endogenous. A NSB shock increases the capital stock
by 12%, which in turn reinforces the effects on employment. In a setup without these interactions,
both unemployment rates would have increased slightly more after the same NSB shock. It is
however worth pointing out that the general equilibrium modelisation is less important for our
19To conduct this simulation, we fix the proportion of high-skilled workers on simple jobs. As a result, the
crowding-out does not move during the simulation. Alternatively, we could assume a perfectly segmented labour
market (crowding-out fixed and equal to 0), but this would be a different model requiring a different calibration,
and making any comparison with the initial model spurious.
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quantitative results than are wage rigidities and crowding-out.
4 Conclusion
Our objective in this paper was to examine the impact of biased technological change and shifts
in labour force composition on the unemployment rate of low- and high-skill workers. For that
purpose we constructed a dynamic general equilibrium model with two types of jobs and two
types of workers, and with endogenous job competition and crowding-out effects. The model was
calibrated on Belgian data (a country which in terms of wage and unemployment changes is quite
representative of the EU average) and simulated to evaluate the quantitative importance over the
last decades of the interactions between net skill bias effects and wage rigidities. Let us emphasize
the following three results:
- our numerical simulations suggest that in the presence of relative wage rigidity, most of the
unemployment rate changes observed between the late seventies and the mid nineties (mod-
erate increase in high-skilled unemployment, huge increase the low skilled unemployment)
can be explained by simply introducing two exogenous shocks, technological bias and labour
force composition;
- search behaviour and job competition effects seem also to play a crucial role; our numeri-
cal simulations suggest that they may have considerably amplified the effects of the biased
technological change on the low-skilled unemployment rate;
- the modeling of the production sector plays a crucial role; by distinguishing final and in-
termediate goods sectors, we avoid the assumption of perfect substitutability between low-
and high-skilled labor implicit in many search equilibrium models and obtain a specification
similar to the one traditionally used in real business cycle models.
Many questions have of course not been answered. For instance to explain rather than assume
relative wage rigidity, or to endogenize the job destruction rate. Economic policy implications
should also be investigated. We leave these questions for future research.
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Appendix 1: Unemployment rates and wage rigidities: some facts
As displayed in Figure 2, the unemployment rate in most European countries is around 2% at the
end of the 50’s. It then increases in the 70’s, and remains high thereafter. It is currently around
8%. In the US, the unemployment rate at the end of the 50’s is around 4%. It also increases during
the 70’s but falls thereafter and is still currently around 4%.
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
1959 1964 1969 1974 1979 1984 1989 1994
US
France 
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Belgium
Source: OECD Economic Outlook (various years). Germany: up to and including 1991, western Germany; subsequent data
concern the whole Germany.
Figure 2: Aggregate unemployment rate
However, this difference between the EU and the US is still more pronounced if we look at the
low-skilled unemployment rate, as in Figure 320. The situation in the EU and the US is quite
similar up to the end of the 70’s, but then completely diverges. The low-skilled situation worsens
in EU countries, while it remains unchanged in the US.
On the contrary, if we look at the high-skilled unemployment rates, as in Figure 421, we see that
the situation on both sides of the Atlantic is much more similar. We also notice that the difference
between the high-skilled and the aggregate unemployment rates is more or less constant. As a
conclusion, the rise in the aggregate EU unemployment rate can be mainly explained by the surge
of the low-skilled unemployment rate.
20In fact, we look at the difference between the low-skilled and the aggregate unemployment rates. Since we do
not have homogeneous data, the definition of the low-skilled can be different across countries and some series are
not updated. However this gives a reasonable picture of the situation.
21We look at the difference between the high-skilled and the aggregate unemployment rates. Again, we do not
have homogeneous data and the definition of the high-skilled can be different across countries. For instance, in US
and Germany we only consider people with a university degree (small share of the population), whereas in Belgium
we also include people with upper secondary education (larger share of the population).
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Figure 3: Low-skilled unemployment rate (difference with the aggregate unemployment rate)
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Figure 4: High-skilled unemployment rate (difference with the aggregate unemployment rate)
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Figure 5 shows that the evolution of relative wages is also quite different in the EU countries and
in the US. For different reasons (downward wage rigidities induced by minimum wage legislation,
collective agreements negotiated by powerful trade unions, ...), the wage dispersion in the EU
remained constant (or even decreased) from end 70’s to mid 90’s. In the US, wage dispersion
strongly increased.
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Figure 5: Wage dispersion
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